Forged Government Checks: Misallocation of Loss by the Federal Common Law by unknown
FORGED GOVERNMENT CHECKS: MISALLOCATION OF
LOSS BY THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
FORGERY of United States checks creates an annual loss of approximately
two and one-half million dollars.' Governed by the federal common law of
negotiable instruments, 2 risk of loss, following the chain of title in a succession
1. Government agents received for investigation 31,931 forged government checks
in fiscal year 1953-54 and completed investigations of 28,837 forged checks having a value
of $2,339,660. SEc'y TREAs. ANN. Rm. 160 (1955). In fiscal year 1954-55, 33,260 checks
were received and 30,177 were investigated. The value of the checks investigated was
$2,609,335.91. SEc'y TanAs. ANN. REP. 150 (1956). The government's authority to issue
checks is found in the power to contract, which is incidental to governmental sovereignty.
See United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet) 115, 127-28 (1831) ; Neilson v. Lagow, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 98, 107 (1851). The United States may enter into any contract not
specifically prohibited by statute or by the Constitution, whether or not the particular contract
is authorized by statute. United States v. Wolper, 86 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1936). Congress
may issue negotiable or non-negotiable commercial obligations. United States v. Janowitz,
257 U.S. 42, 45 (1921) (war savings certificates) ; Legal Tender Case, 110 U.S. 421, 444
(1884) (treasury notes) ; Security Nat'l Bank v. People's Bank, 287 Mo. 464, 473, 230
S.W. 87, 89-90 (1921) (liberty bonds). Courts have never doubted that government
checks were intended to be negotiable.
2. Federal common law governs the rights and duties of the government on its own
checks. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) ; National Metropolitan
Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); United States v. Continental-American Bank
& Trust Co., 175 F2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949); BRANNAN,
NEGOTIADLE INSTRUMENTS 108 (7th ed., Beutel 1948) (hereinafter cited as BRANNAN) ;
Pofcher, The Choice of Laow, State or Federal, in Cases Involving Government Contracts,
12 LA. L. REv. 37, 43 (1951) ; Comments, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 991 (1953), 30 ORE. L. REv.
164 (1951).
Use of federal law is based on: (1) the need for uniformity in interpretation of the
government's rights and duties, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra at 367; Gorrell
and Weed, Erie RR: Ten Years After, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 276, 296 (1948) ; cf. United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947) ; (2) the fact that the rights are federally
created, see United States v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 209 F.2d 578 (10th Cir.
1954); Comment, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561, 577 (1955); cf. Garrett v. Moore-MicCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942); and (3) the presence of the United States as a party,
MOORE COM ENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 344 (1949); see United States v. County of
Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944). Courts have fashioned the federal common law of
commercial paper from the law merchant of the Swift v. Tyson era, Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, supra at 367, and the NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAw (hereinafter cited
as NIL), New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. RFC, 180 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1950).
Suits between private parties on government checks are governed by state law when
they involve questions "essentially of local concern." Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S.
29 (1956) (burden of proof), 10 VAND. L. REv. 616 (1957), 56 COLUm. L. REv. 438 (1956),
1 VILLANOVA L. REy. 344 (1956). For cases reaching the same result without considering
the choice of law problem, see Oquendo v. Federal Reserve Bank, 98 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 656 (1938) (authority to endorse); McMurray v. Rhode Island,
Inc., 117 A.2d 114 (D.C. Mfunic. Ct. 1955) (same) ; McCollum v. Graber, 207 Ark. 1053,
184 S.W.2d 264 (1944) (status as holder in due course) ; Bryant v. McGowan, 151 Pa.
Super. 529, 30 A.2d 667 (1943) (status of payee). But even in a suit between private
litigants, federal law determines issues on the nature of the rights and obligations created
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of lawsuits, may temporarily rest on a number of parties. But the ultimate risk
will fall on the party who must pursue his remedy against the forger.3 Both
drawer and drawee of its own checks, the government, as drawee, will bring
the first suit to recover payment from the party, ordinarily a bank, that pre-
sented the forged check. 4 And the resolution of this action determines where
the ultimate risk of loss will lie. If the government is successful, the presenting
bank will sue its predecessor in the chain of title, and the ultimate risk will be
borne by the original taker from the forger.5 Should the initial action fail, the
by the government paper itself, Bank of America v. Parnell, supra at 34 (whether govern-
ment bonds were overdue), and those involving a "federal interest" in uniformity of inter-
pretation, United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 F. Supp. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1943)
(transferability of United States savings bonds) ; Stephens v. First Nat'l Bank, 65 Nev.
352, 196 P.2d 756 (1948) (same). Federal law will be used to achieve uniformity even
though contrary to state policy. Succession of Tanner, 24 So.2d 642 (La. 1946) ; Ervin v.
Conn, 225 N.C. 267, 34 S.E.2d 402 (1945) ; Jones, United States Savings Bonds, Series E,
F and G, 11 MD. L. REv. 265 (1950). The tenuous distinctions drawn in the few re-
ported decisions make it difficult to predict which issues involved in private suits will be
subject to federal law. For a discussion of the choice of law problem in allied fields, see
Notes, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1956) (Farmers Home Administration Act), 55 COLum.
L. REv. 574 (1955) (Veterans' Emergency Housing Act).
Private notes or checks, however, remain subject to state law even though the United
States is a party. United States v. Hansett, 120 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1941); United
States v. Skinner, 137 F. Supp. 234 (D. Idaho 1956) ; United States v. Klatt, 135 F.
Supp. 648 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
3. Suit against the forger is an unsatisfactory remedy since he may have left the juris-
diction, have no funds or have "been hanged." See Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1355, 97 Eng.
Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762); Moore, Forgery by Employees, 3 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER No. 1,
pp. 60, 69-70 (Jan. 1957).
4. Normally, a government agency, as drawer, will draw a check on the Treasury
Department, as drawee. The fact that the government is both drawer and drawee of its
checks eliminates one step in the procedural chain of recovery through which losses from
forged checks are allocated. In private law, the drawer sues the drawee for charging his
account with a forged check. BIrTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 132 (1943) (hereinafter cited
as BRTroN). And the drawee, if liable, has an action against the party who presented the
check to it. Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 418 (1953). But the government, as drawer-
drawee, sues a presenting bank directly.
Where the United States has tunds in a private bank, it is treated like any other'
drawer. England Nat'l Bank v. United States, 282 Fed. 121 (8th Cir. 1922); United
States v. National Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1891). Upon receiving
cancelled checks from a drawee bank, the government has a duty to examine them within
a reasonable time to determine whether the drawee has charged any forged or altered
checks to its account. England Nat'l Bank v. United States, supra at 126-27. And
failure to make this examination within a reasonable time, or to notify the drawee without
delay upon discovery of a defective check, is deemed a conclusive admission of the account's
correctness. Ibid; Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886) ; Comment,
6 ARK. L. REv. 199 (1952). See, generally, Arant, Forged Checks-The Duty of the De-
positor to His Bank, 31 YALE L.J. 598 (1922) ; White, In Re: Liability of Bank for Pay-
ment of Forged or Unauthorized Checks, 17 INs. COUNSEL J. 162 (1950).
5. See BRITTON § 139.
Whether or not the government is successful, it will still be liable to the payee on the
underlying obligation. See Rettinghouse v. Krey Packing Co., 200 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. App.
1947) (payee against drawer on underlying obligation); Shepard and Morse Lumber
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government will bear the risk of loss, suit against the forger becoming its sole
possibility for relief.6 Although the courts have not been influenced by the
general volume of federal check transactions to favor the government in any
given suit, they have also failed to consider its natural capacity for risk dis-
tribution as a basis for denying recovery.7 Rather, losses have been allocated
under traditional doctrine which determines liability according to the type of
forgery involved. Occasionally, the risk of loss so imposed is actually based on
negligence; more often, the result can be attributed only to mechanical appli-
cation of the doctrine.
When its signature as drawer is forged, the government bears the ultimate
risk of loss. Under the "final payment rule," it cannot recover sums expended
in cashing such a check from a good faith presenting bank.8 As drawee, the
Co. v. Eldridge, 171 Mass. 516, 51 N.E. 9 (1898) (dictum) (same) ; Blacker and Shepard
Co. v. Granite Trust Co., 284 Mass. 9, 187 N.E. 53 (1933) (payee against drawee for con-
version); A. Paul Goodall Real Estate & Ins. Co. v. North Birmingham Am. Bank,
225 Ala. 507, 144 So. 7 (1932) (payee against drawee for money had and received). See,
generally, Kessler, Levi & Ferguson, Some Aspects of Payment by Negotiable Instruments:
A Comparative Study, 45 YALE L.J. 1373 (1936).
6. Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 417 (1953).
7. "[G]reat business houses are held to ... [the same] responsibility... [as] small ones.
The United States does business on business terms . . . [and] is not excepted from the
general rule[s] [of negotiable instruments] by the largeness of its dealings and its having
to employ agents to do what if done by a principal in person would leave no room for
doubt." United States v. National Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1926). When
the government becomes a party to commercial paper, it yields its position of sover-
eignty and enters the domain of commerce where it enjoys the same rights and suffers
the same responsibilities as private persons. See, e.g., The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 666, 675 (1869); Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875); United
States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340, 350 (1934). See, generally, Wachtell,
Sovereign Immunity and Its Application to Commercial Paper, 6 BROOmYN L. REv. 1
(1936) ; Dcvelopments in the Law-Remedies Against The United States and Its Officials,
70 HARv. L. REv. 827, 884 (1957). The United States would probably have to subject
itself to the usual rules of commercial paper in any event or parties would be reluctant
to accept government checks. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 788 (D.N.J.
1955).
Congress has removed the usual sovereign immunity from suit in the area of govern-
ment check transactions. See the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(4) (1952), making the
government amenable to suit on express and implied contracts.
No case has been found in which the court has considered risk-distribution as a basis
of government liability.
8. United States v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 252 U.S. 485 (1920) ; Bank of United States
v. Bank of Georgia, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333 (1825). See BRiTToN §§ 133, 135-36;
Aigler, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 24 MIct. L. REV. 809 (1926) ; Note, 2 U. CINN.
L. R.m 299 (1928).
Negligence of a party in receiving a forged check will make it liable to the government.
See United States v. Chase Nat'l Bank, supra at 495-96 (dictum) ; Comment, 43 ILL. L.
REv. 823 (1949).
The federal courts have refused to extend the final payment rule to postal money
orders. Bolognesi v. United States, 189 Fed. 335 (2d Cir. 1911); United States v.
Nurthwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 35 F. Supp. 484 (D. Minn. 1940). But see United
States v. Citizens and So. Nat'l Bank, 144 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ga. 1956).
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government is held to knowledge of the drawer signatures of authorized
agents.9 Paying a check bearing a forged signature thus becomes negligence
estopping the government from relying on the forgery in a suit against the bank.'"
Similar reasoning is used to defeat claims for overpayment of a raised check.
Since the government "knows" the amount of its checks, payment estops it
from later questioning the face value.-
On the other hand, paying a check bearing a forged endorsement does not
automatically preclude recovery by the government.' 2 In presenting this type
of forged check for payment, a bank impliedly warrants its title.13 But since
a forged endorsement does not convey title, this warranty is breached. In addi-
tion, the defect in title constitutes a lack of consideration which, voiding
the transaction, enables the government to recover for money had and re-
ceived.' 4 Moreover, modern Treasury regulations furnish an additional
remedy by requiring an express guaranty of prior endorsements on presenta-
tion of a government check.15 This guaranty warrants all prior endorsements
9. United States v. Chase Natl Bank, supra note 8, at 496; United States v. Bank
of New York, 219 Fed. 648, 650 (2d Cir. 1914).
10. Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 397 (1875) (dictum).
11. United States v. National Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527 (1926), 26 COLuma.
L. REv. 1030 (1926), 11 MINx. L. REv. 68 (1926); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States,
45 Fed. 337 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1891) (dictum). Generally, a drawee is not charged with
knowledge of the amount of a drawer's checks. BarON § 140. Consequently, a drawee
can recover the amount that a check has been altered, even from a good faith purchaser.
Woodward, The Risk of Forgery or Alteration of Negotiable Instruments, 24 CoLumX.
L. REv. 469, 474 (1924). But the United States, since it is both drawer and drawee, is
considered similar to a maker paying his own altered note. See 35 YALE LJ. 1009, 1010
(1926).
12. The majority of forged government checks bear forged endorsements. See SEc'v
TRzAs. ANN. REP. 113 (1956).
13. United States v. National Exchange Bank, 214 U.S. 302, 319 (1909).
14. Id. at 316; Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 128 U.S. 26, 35
(1888) ; Ladd & Tilton Bank v. United States, 30 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1929); United
States v. National Bank of Republic, 141 Fed. 208, 209 (C.C.D. Mass. 1902); United
States v. Story, 34 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Tenn. 1.940).
15. 31 C.F.R. § 20225(c) (1949).
At common law, a drawee who paid a check bearing a forged endorsement could not
recover the amount of the check from an agent presenting bank which had remitted the
proceeds to its principal. United States v. American Exchange Nat'l Bank, 70 Fed.
232 (S.D.N.Y. 1895) ; WOODWARD, QUASI CoNTRAcrs § 27 (1913). The express guaranty
of prior endorsements made a presenting bank liable to the drawee, regardless of such
remission. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 25 F.2d 995 (N.D. Ga. 1928);
20 ORE. L. REv. 80 (1940).
If a government check is drawn payable to the drawer himself, the guaranty includes
the drawer's endorsement. 31 C.F.R. §§ 202.25 (c), 202.27 (1949). This could be interpreted
to restrict the final payment rule, see text at notes 8-11, where a party forges a drawer's
signature and makes the check payable to that drawer. An endorsement of the drawer's
name by the defrauding party is a forgery. Hence, the government could sue a presenting
bank for breach of its guaranty of the drawer's endorsement. Absent an express over-
ruling of the final payment doctrine, however, the regulation should apply only to cases
involving a valid drawer's signature. Even if the regulation was not intended to be so
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effective to give the holder legal title and the coincident right to enforce pay-
ment. " Since a forged endorsement cannot convey these rights, presenting
the check for payment also breaches the express guaranty.Y
7
The government's right to sue the presenting bank for breach of express
guaranty or implied warranty is restricted by a statute of limitations and the
operation of laches. The period of limitation expires six years after accrual of
the government's cause of action.' s Since the guaranties of prior endorse-
ments and title are breached when the check is cashed, and the right to sue is
not dependent on notice or demand, the cause of action is complete at the date
of payment.' 9 Within the limitation period, prompt discovery of a forgery is
limited, the guaranty should have no effect since forgery of the drawer's signature makes
the check wholly inoperative. See United States v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 252 U.S. 485,
495-96 (1920) (government denied recovery where both drawer's and payee's signatures
forged and names were the same); NIL § 23.
16. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340, 349 (1934). The guaranty
does not extend to warranting a payee's legal status, such as widowhood, which is a
condition precedent to the payee's receiving a check from the government. United States
v. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 34 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. Pa. 1940), 7 U. Pirr. L. REv.
51 (1940); United States v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 26 F.2d 493 (W.D. Ky. 1928). Never-
theless, the government can recover money paid to a holder who knows that the payee
is not entitled to the check because of a change in status. United States v. Michaelson, 58
F. Supp. 796 (D. Minn. 1945).
17. National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
For a general discussion of the actions for breach of implied warranty and express
guaranty, see BRT-rON § 139; Dahlin, What Bankers Should Know About Forged En-
dorsements, 73 BANKING L.J. 394 (1956) ; Corker, Risk of Loss from Forged Endorse-
ments, 4 STAN. L. REv. 24 (1951); Kessler, Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863
(1938) ; Note, 22 U. CIN. L. Ray. 219 (1953).
18. 60 STAT. 31 (1946), 31 U.S.C. § 129 (1952). "The general purpose of this
legislation is to provide relief for banks, merchants, and others handling Government
checks by limiting the time within which the Government may bring action to recover the
proceeds of such checks by reason of a forged endorsement or unauthorized signature."
H.R. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945). The statute of limitations has been
interpreted to have retroactive effect. United States v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 175 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1949).
If a party liable for presenting a forged check fraudulently conceals the cause of action
from the United States, a suit by the government may be brought within two years after
the discovery of such cause of action. 60 STAT. 31 (1946), 31 U.S.C. § 131 (1952).
When the government becomes the holder of a private note or check, it is considered
acting in a "sovereign capacity" and thus exempt from the operation of laches or any
statute of limitations. United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486 (1878) ; Person v. United
States, 112 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1940); United States v. Thomas, 107 F.2d 765 (5th Cir.
1939). However, transfer of a commercial instrument, on which the statute of limitations
has already run, to the United States will not give the government an enforceable claim.
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) ; United States v. Buford,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 12, 29-30 (1830).
19. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 368 (1943) ; Leather Manu-
facturers' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 128 U.S. 26 (1888); United States v. City Say.
Bank & Trust Co., 73 F.2d 486, 487 (6th Cir. 1934) ; United States v. National Bank of
Republic, 141 Fed. 208, 209 (C.C.D. Mass. 1902). See also Note, Application of Statute
of Limitations to Forged Indorsements in Check Collection Cases, 47 YALE L.J. 827 (1938).
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not a condition precedent to suit by the government. 20 Once a forgery has
been discovered, however, failure to give prompt notice to a presenting bank
may operate as laches. 2' Thus recovery by the government will be barred
where the delay in notice causes damage-loss of recourse against prior en-
dorsers-to the presenting bank.
22
Moreover, timely suit may fail under the "impostor rule," which prevents
recovery when the government itself created the risk of loss. Inducing the
government to issue him a check by misrepresenting his identity, an impostor
acquires legal title.23 His subsequent endorsement in the assumed name is not
a forgery, since the government intended to make the check payable to him.
24
So expressed, the impostor rule precludes the government's recovery against
the presenting bank.2 5 For the latter warranted the check was properly en-
20. National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 457 (1945), 7 GA.
B.J. 483.
21. Ladd & Tilton Bank v. United States, 30 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1929) (delay of
nineteen months); United States v. Clinton Nat'l Bank, 28 Fed. 357 (C.C.S.D. Iowa
1886) (ten years); United States v. National Rockland Bank, 35 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mass.
1940) (ten years); United States v. National City Bank, 28 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1939) (three and one-half years) ; United States v. Citizens Union Nat'l Bank, 40 F.
Supp. 609 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (five years, state law applied). See Notes, 15 GA. B.J. 243
(1952), 10 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 263 (1955).
22. United States v. National Rockland Bank, supra note 21 (bankruptcy of prior
parties) ; United States v. National City Bank, supra note 21 (same). But see Fulton
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 197 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1952) (running of state statute of
limitations), 37 MINN. L. REv. 201 (1953).
Mere delay, without any damage to a party, will not operate as laches against the
government. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943); United
States v. National Exchange Bank, 141 Fed. 209 (C.C.D. Mass. 1905) ; United States v.
National Park Bank, 6 Fed. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1881). See Note, 55 COLUIS. L. REv. 1177,
1181-82 (1955).
23. See United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co., 175 F.2d 271
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949).
24. United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co., 161 F.2d 935, 936 (5th
Cir. 1947) retrial, 79 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. La. 1948), aff'd, 175 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 92
F. Supp. 356, 358 (W.D.N.C. 1950). United States v. Bank of North Wilkesboro, 183
Fed. 759, 760 (4th Cir. 1910); United States v. National Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. 163,
166 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1891).
The government has argued that a disbursing agent has no authority to issue a check
to other than a real beneficiary and, therefore, cannot intend to make a check payable to an
impostor. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 131 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 318 U.S. 774 (1943). But the courts have refused to assume that the agent
could not have intended to give a check to the impostor merely because he had no legal
authority to do so. Instead, they derive the requisite intent from the physical transfer of
the instrument. United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co., supra at 937;
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, supra at 989.
25. United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co., 79 F. Supp. 450, 454
(W.D. La. 1948), aff'd 175 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949), 21 So.
CALIF. L. RE'. 280 (1948), 34 VA. L. REv. 85 (1948); United States v. First Nat'l Bank,
supra note 24, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 1195; United States v. National Exchange Bank, supra
note 24. In a few early cases the courts refused to apply the impostor rule. See Onondaga
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dorsed, not honestly obtained. 26 The government's negligence in allowing the
impostor's fraud is thus employed to defeat its claim.2 T If the presenting bank
failed to exercise reasonable care in receiving a check from an impostor or
negligently contributed to his fraud, however, the government will be allowed
to recover. 28 Liability under the impostor rule gives way to the negligence of
the bank which is deemed to have caused the risk of loss.
29
Often, the government's negligence has not been recognized in cases seem-
ingly within the scope of the impostor rule. Where a check payable to a named
payee is erroneously delivered to another person with the same or similar
name, the impostor rule does not bar recovery by the government.30 And the
County Sav. Bank v. United States, 64 Fed. 703, 705 (2d Cir. 1894); United States v.
Canal Bank & Trust Co., 29 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. La. 1939) ; United States v. National
City Bank, 28 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
Usually the impostor fraudulently obtains a certificate, such as an Adjusted Service
Certificate, which entitles the beneficiary designated therein to a government check.
He then represents himself as the beneficiary to a government agency. On the basis of
the certificate, and a possible notarized statement that he is the beneficiary, the agency
will issue a check to him. See, e.g., United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust
Co., 79 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. La. 1948), aff'd, 175 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
870 (1949). For general discussion of the impostor rule, see Abel, The Imposter Payee:
Or, Rhode Island Was Right, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 161, 362; Witherspoon, What is The
Imposter Rule?, 51 Com. L.J. 137 (1946) ; Notes, 3 U. FLA. L. REV. 129 (1950), 36 GEO.
L.J. 427 (1948), 7 BRCOKLYN L. REv. 220 (1937).
26. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 92 F. Supp. 356, 359 (W.D.N.C.
1950) ; United States v. Continental-American Bank & Trust Co., supra note 25, at 454.
27. The government is under a duty to ascertain the party entitled to a government
check. United States v. National Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. 163, 166-67 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1891). Delivering a check to an unentitled person is negligence which is deemed the cause
of any loss. Id. at 167; United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 17 F. Supp. 611,
613-14 (W.D. Okla. 1936). Moreover, a government agency expects a party to pay a
check on the same identification and proofs which induced the agency to issue the check.
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 131 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
774 (1943). A bank relying on these means of identification in cashing an "impostor"
check exercises reasonable care and is thereby relieved from liability. United States
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 92 F. Supp. 356, 359 (W.D.N.C. 1950).
For a negligence approach to the imposter rule in state law, see, e.g., Santa Maria
v. Industrial City Bank and Banking Co., 326 Mass. 440, 95 N.E.2d 176 (1950); Com-
ment, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 427-28 (1953).
28. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1939) (failure to exer-
cise reasonable care in identifying intended payee); United States v. Michaelson, 58 F.
Supp. 796 (D. Minn. 1945) (party should have known impostor not entitled to check) ;
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 124 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1941) (bank certified that
impostor was person he pretended to be).
29. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 124 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1941).
30. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 197 F.2d 763, 764 (5th Cir. 1952); United
States v. National City Bank, 28 F. Supp. 144, 149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (dictum). Cf. the
minority state rule that mailing a check to a wrong party with the same name as the in-
tended payee constitutes sufficient negligence to make the drawer bear the risk of loss.
Keck v. Browne, 314 Ky. 151, 234 S.W.2d 183 (1950), 39 Ky. L.J. 476 (1951); S. Weis-
berger Co. v. Barberton Say. Co., 84 Ohio St 21, 95 N.E. 379 (1911) ; BsuTroq § 152.
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government has been allowed recovery for paying a check issued to an im-
postor but endorsed in the assumed name by another party.3' Although the
endorsement in each of these cases is a forgery, and the results could thus be
explained in terms of defective title, the courts have still overlooked the gov-
ernment's negligence in delivering and issuing such checks.
32
Further, the "fictitious payee rule," regularly utilized to allocate private
forgery losses on the basis of negligence, has been rejected by the federal
courts. When an employee fraudulently draws checks to non-existent payees
and endorses them to his own use, his employer bears the risk of loss under
the Negotiable Instruments Law.33 A check payable to a fictitious payee is
considered bearer paper so that title passes by delivery.3 4 Thus the employee's
31. United States v. Union Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 819, 822 (D. Md. 1956) (dictum)
(listing of exceptions to impostor rule). Some state courts have reached a contrary
conclusion. See, e.g., Russell v. Second Nat'l Bank, 136 N.J.L. 270, 55 A.2d 211 (Ct Err.
& App. 1947).
32. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 197 F.2d 763, 764 (5th Cir. 1952).
33. Bartlett v. First Nat'l Bank, 247 Ill. 490, 93 N.E. 337 (1910) ; Snyder v. Corn
Exchange Nat'l Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 AtI. 876 (1908). See, generally, BRIrrox § 149;
Maurice, Check Forgery Claims-Fictitious Payees and Imposters, 1944 INs. L.J. 201;
Thayer, Fictitiolus Payees in Bills of Exchange: A Comparative Study, 25 Ky. L.J. 203
(1937); Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. Ray. 281 (1951).
The NIL is in effect in every state of the union, with the exception of Pennsylvania
which recently repealed the act and adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. 5 UNIFORM
LAws ANN. 6 (Supp. 1956). It is the only uniform law which has received unanimous
state adoption. Horack, The Future of Uniform Laws-The Commercial Code, 9 01Ho
ST. L.J. 555 (1948). However, the effectiveness of the NIL's attempt to establish a truly
national body of law has been questioned. STEFEN, STATUTORY MATERIAL FOR CASES
ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER vi-viii (2d ed. 1954). Judicial interpretation
and amendments by state legislatures have resulted in conflicting doctrines. Id. at vi.
Moreover, the NIL does not cover the entire field of commercial paper. NIL § 196. And
in this area, where the law merchant governs, divergencies among states are frequent.
See BRANNAN 72 (confusion in the law merchant).
For discussion of problems of loss allocation under state law see, e.g., BRITrON, §§ 133-
152; BRANNAN 437-80; Corker, Risk of Loss from Forged Indorsements. 4 STAN. L. REV.
24 (1951) ; Kessler, Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863 (1938) ; Woodward, The Risk
of Forgery or Alteration of Negotiable Instruments, 24 COLUm. L. Rav. 469 (1924) ; Com-
ment, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under The Law of Negotiable Instrn-
ments and The Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417 (1953); Comment, 22 U. CIN.
L. REv. 219 (1953).
34. American Hominy Co. v. National Bank, 294 Ill. 223, 128 N.E. 391 (1920);
Mueller & Martin Co. v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 187 Ky. 44, 218 S.W. 465 (1920); NIL
§§ 9(3), 30.
The main problem has been the determination of when a check is payable to a fictitious
payee. Note, 2 DRAKE L. Rxv. 70 (1952). NIL § 9(3) provides: "The instrument is
payable to bearer: . . . (3) when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing
person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable." The phrase "the
person making it so payable" has been interpreted to mean the party who actually drew
the check. Kulp, The Fictitious Payee, 18 MICH. L. Ray. 296, 304 (1919). Therefore, a
check will be payable to bearer only if the fraudulent employee himself signs the check
with the intent that it be payable to a non-existent party. See cases collected in BRANNAN
324. But negligence in not discovering the fraud of his employee may bar the employer
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forged, but unnecessary, endorsement does not defeat the title of any subse-
quent holder.35' In addition, by amendment to the NIL, many states apply
the fictitious payee rule to cases where one employee fraudulently makes out
the checks but another signs as drawer, 36 and where the defrauding employee
induces the drawer to issue checks to non-existent payees by supplying a
voucher.37 Yet, when a government employee fraudulently prepares a series
of checks payable to fictitious payees, and some other employee signs as drawer,
the latter's intent to make the checks payable to existing persons controls.38
Consequently, the paper is considered payable to order and title will pass only
by genuine endorsement.3 9 Because a forgery is not a genuine endorsement,
the risk of loss will fall on the party who took the check from the defrauding
employee.40 And, in the one case in which a government employee himself
fraudulently signed as drawer, the court held the government, not the em-
from recovery. Id. at 323-24. And statutory amendment in many states has extended the
rule to other cases where the fraudulent employee does not sign the check. See text at
notes 36-37 infra.
35. Southall v. Columbia Nat'l Bank, 244 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Mo. App. 1951) ; Prugh,
Combest & Land, Inc. v. Linwood State Bank, 241 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Mo. App. 1951). Since
a check payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery, no endorsement is necessary to pass
title. See NIL § 30.
36. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 293 Ill. App.
423, 12 N.E.2d 714 (1938).
37. Hillman v. Kropp Forge Co., 340 Ill. App. 606, 92 N.E.2d 537 (1950) ; Citizens
Loan & Security Co. v. Trust Co., 79 Ga. App. 184, 53 S.E.2d 179 (1949). The amendment
provides: ". . . the instrument is payable to bearer ... (3) when it is payable to the order
of a fictitious or non-existing... person ... and such fact was known to the person making
it so payable or known to his employee or other agent who supplies the name of such
payee." NIL § 9(3), as amended. (Emphasis added.) It has been adopted in twenty states.
See 5 UmFoRM LAws ANN. 24-25 (Supp. 1956) ; see also Boardman, Proper Construc-
tion of The So-Called "Bankers' Amendinent" to Section 9(3) of the Negotiable In-
struments Act and Its Significance Respecting Forgery Clains Under Bankers' Blanket
Bonds, 17 INs. COUNSEL J. 166 (1950).
38. See National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945), 31 VA.
L. Pv. 683 (1945); Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. United States, 134 F.2d 59 (D.C.
Cir. 1943), 31 GEo. L.J. 487; Farmers' State Bank v. United States, 62 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.
1932). The subject situation would not ordinarily be covered by the fictitious payee rule.
See note 34 supra. However, the government would bear the ultimate risk of loss if the
court found the government negligent or NIL § 9(3) as amended incorporated in the
federal common law. Ibid. The government has once been held liable in a similar situation
on the basis of the policy of § 9(3), even though the amended section was not part of the
state law which the court ostensibly applied. United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n 47 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Cal. 1942). A new trial was granted because of
the mandate of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), see note 2
supra, to apply federal law. United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & .Say. Ass'n,
51 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Cal. 1943). The final disposition of the case was not reported.
39. Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. United States, 134 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
NIL § 30.
40. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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ployee, drawer of the check.41 Since defrauding the government was clearly
beyond the scope of the employee's authority, neither his knowledge that the
payee was fictitious nor his intent to make the check so payable was imputed
to the government, which itself would not intend to draw a check to a non-
existent person.42 Accordingly, the court held the check to be order, not bearer,
paper, thus enabling the government to recover. 43 A contrary holding would
have required treating the employee as drawer. In refusing to do so, the court
departed from the established pattern of state law without explanation.44 The
fictitious payee rule was thus rejected.
But allowing the government to recover in fictitious payee situations re-
quires disregard of its negligence. Proper examination and supervision by
government officials could reduce the loss caused by the actions of fraudulent
employees through restricting their opportunities for obtaining fictitious payee
checks.45 Yet the presenting bank which has expressly guaranteed prior en-
dorsements cannot raise want of care on the part of government officials as a
defense.46 Their negligence is deemed insufficient to overcome the bank's
41. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 205 Fed. 433 (9th Cir. 1913),
judgement aff'd on new opinion, 224 Fed. 679 (9th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 658
(1916) ; BairroN 700-702 & n.3; BRANNAN 330.
42. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 205 Fed. 433, 438 (9th Cir. 1913).
As a general rule, the government is bound on its checks only when they are drawn by
authorized agents. The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868) ; Hooe v. United
States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910) ; United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1949) ; STREET,
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY, A COIPARATIVE STUDY 84 (1953); Mclntire, Authority of
Govermnent Contracting Officers: Estoppel and Apparent Authority, 25 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 162 (1957).
Treasury circulars, requiring that checks drawn by government disbursing officers be
in favor of a named party, have been interpreted as denying such officers power to issue
checks payable to fictitious payees. National Bank of Commerce v. United States, 224
Fed. 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 658 (1916) ; Security First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 103 F.2d 188, 189 (9th Cir. 1.939) (dictum) (Veterans' Bureau
has no authority to issue checks payable to fictitious or non-existent persons). See 31
C.F.R. § 208A (1949). This governmental denial reinforces the conclusion that the govern-
ment would not intend to make checks payable to fictitious payees.
43. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 205 Fed. 433, 437 (9th Cir. 1913).
44. Id. at 438.
Allowing the government to recover in this case appears to violate established principle ,
of federal law as well. The employee who actually drew the check either did or did not
have authority to do so. If he had authority, his knowledge and intent would have betn
imputed to the government as the court itself recognized. Ibid. With his intent so
imputed, the check would be payable to bearer, and the government could not recover.
On the other hand, if the employee did not have authority, his signing the check would
constitute forgery. See United States v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 252 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1920).
Although the employee's subsequent endorsement would be another forgery, the govern-
ment would still be barred from recovery under the final payment rule. The forged en-
dorsement does not affect the government's failure as drawee to detect the forged drawer's
signature. United States v. Chase Nat'l Bank, supra at 495-96.
45. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
46. See National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1945);
Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. United States, 134 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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breach of its freely made guaranty.47 Only negligence proximately affecting
the conduct of a bank in guaranteeing endorsements will bar recovery by the
government.
4 8
Disregarding the government's negligence undermines a basic objective of
commercial law through inhibiting the promotion of sound business practice.
By imposing risk of loss on those who fail to meet a reasonable standard of
care, the commercial law induces adherence to such practice.4 9 The aim is
achieved when the impostor rule bars recovery by the government because
of the lack of care with which it issued a check.50 And utilization of the
fictitious payee rule would further implement this end. The government has
the best opportunity to avoid any loss that may result from the acts of a fraud-
ulent employee. It can make extensive character investigations of those it
hires, safeguard the disbursing process by audit and control, and require fidelity
bonds from its employees. 51 Recognizing negligence as ground for denying
recovery by the government would stimulate it to take appropriate steps in an
effort to minimize potential losses.
52
Accordingly, federal courts should adopt the fictitious payee rule and give
full scope to the impostor rule. The fictitious payee rule should apply when
the fraudulent employee has the questioned check signed by another as well as
when he signs it himself.53 Secondly, cases of checks delivered to the right
name but the wrong person and those involving endorsement by the impostor's
accomplice should be recognized as within the compass of the impostor rule.
5 4
Since misplaced trust and failure to exercise proper supervision are common
to all of these situations, allowing the rules to bar governmental recovery
effectuates recognition of negligence as the basis of liability.55 Adoption of these
47. National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, supra note 46, at 458. Considering
a guaranty required on presentment for payment as freely made appears questionable. See
note 15 supra and accompanying text. See also Brief for Appellees, p. 43, National Metro-
politan Bank v. United States, supra, (Treasury Department practice to decline to pay
checks presented without guaranty of prior endorsements).
48. See United States v. National Exchange Bank, 214 U.S. 302, 319 (1909) (dictum).
49. See, e.g., UNIFORUI CoImERCIAL CODE § 3-406; Corker, Risk of Loss from Forged
Indorsements, 4 STAN. L. REv. 24, 27-28 (1951); Britton, Negligence in The Law of Bills
and Notes, 24 COLUm. L. REv. 695 (1924) ; Notes, 54 MIcH. L. Rzv. 996 (1956), 96 U. PA.
L. REv. 134 (1947), 27 VA. L. Ray. 103 (1940).
50. See note 27 supra.
51. Corker, supra note 49, at 31-32; Moore, Forgery by Employees, 3 THE PRACTICAL
LAWYER No. 1, p. 60 (Jan. 1957); Comment, 18 U. CHL L. Rav. 281, 288 (1.951).
52. If the government is not held liable in both impostor and fictitious payee 'cases, it
will not be induced to introduce a program designed to prevent the occurrence of these
cases. If, on the other hand, the government is held liable, it will introduce such a pro-
gram whenever the cost is less than the losses otherwise resulting. Moreover, the govern-
ment, through its control over the persons issuing these checks, is the only party that
could introduce a successful program and thus be able to compare the cost of prevention
with the cost of non-prevention.
53. See notes 33, 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 30, 31 supra and accompanying text.
55. Absent gross negligence on the part of the government, lack of care by any other
party should relieve it from liability. State courts have occasionally employed such a com-
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changes would result in the government's bearing the risk of loss from forged
check transactions at least as often as private parties.
But the unique position of the government as a risk-distributor justifies its
bearing the risk of loss where private parties would not be liable.5 This re-
sult flows from extension of the final payment rule to all forgery situations.5
Thus, the government would be presumed to know the signatures of its payees
and payment on a forged endorsement would be deemed adoption of the check
as valid. 5s Admittedly, the possibility of the government's actually knowing the
signatures of its payees appears slight. But actual knowledge of the amount
of a check or of the signature of a drawer seems equally improbable. Yet the
government is regularly held to the latter under the final payment rule.59 The
ultimate justification for governmental liability under this rule lies in consider-
ations of risk distribution. Still, whether the particular loss was caused by for-
gery of a drawer's signature, an improper endorsement or a raised amount,
the government has similar likelihood of knowledge and equal capacity for risk
distribution. In the absence of another party's negligence, therefore, it should
consistently bear the risk of loss.
Extension of the final payment rule, as modified by negligence concepts, will
place the loss on the best risk-distributor, promote transferability of govern-
ment checks and contribute to a reduction in forgeries. Even if the govern-
ment never bore the loss under existing law and would always do so with the
doctrine revised, the resulting increase in government expenditures would be
negligible. ° But bearing the loss from a forged check would generally be a
parative negligence standard in fixing liability. See, e.g., Basch v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 316, 139 P.2d 1 (1943). For a discussion of the problems
involved in establishing a standard of reasonable care in commercial transactions, see Klaus,
Identification of the Holder and Tender of Receipt on The Counter-Presentation of
Checks, 13 MINN. L. REv. 281 (1929) ; Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 438-39 (1953).
56. Placing the loss from check forgeries on the best risk-distributor has been recom-
mended by several commentators. See, e.g., Corker, supra note 49, at 30-31; Kessler,
Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863, 896-97 (1.938) ; Notes, 43 IL.. L. REv. 823, 831
(1949), 37 MINN. L. RT. 201, 204 (1953), 14 U. CmI. L. REv. 705, 708 (1947).
57. See text at notes 8-11 supra.
58. See notes 9, 11 supra and accompanying text.
The government is not charged with knowledge of the signatures of its payees under
existing law. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943) ; United
States v. National Exchange Bank, 214 U.S. 302, 317-18 (1909) (discussion of policy).
Unless the government was presumed to know the signatures of its endorsers as well
as those of its payees, the taker from the forger would bear the ultimate risk of loss when
an endorser's signature was forged. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. But this
possibility is slight. No case has been found in which an endorser's signature was forged.
59. See notes 9, 11 supra and accompanying text.
60. Total government expenditures for fiscal year 1955 were over sixty-four billion
dollars. SEc'Y Teaxs. ANN. REP. 383 (1956). And the total loss from forged checks
was over two and one-half million dollars. See note 1 supra. Therefore, assuming the
government bore the entire forgery loss and had borne none of it previously, the resulting
increase in the budget would be approximately .0004%, an annual per capita charge of
less than one and one-half cents.
The government presently discharges its losses from forged checks with funds appro-
priated for that specific purpose. 55 STAT. 777 (1941), 31 U.S.C. § 561 (1952).
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burden on any other party.61 Moreover, should the loss ultimately rest on a
good risk-distributor, such as a bank, its capacity to spread losses could not
approach that of the government which has the taxing power at its disposal.
6 2
This contrast is accentuated when the loss is borne by a party unlikely to in-
sure and without ability to distribute the risk by other means. 3 Extending the
final payment rule will also increase transferability since private parties, pro-
tected from forgery loss, will be more willing to accept government checks.
0 4
And realizing that their negligence will shift the risk of loss from the govern-
ment to themselves, private parties will, like the government, be stimulated to
employ better business practice in order to minimize potential losses. With all
parties thus seeking to prevent loss, the possibilities for successful forgery
should be substantially restricted.
61. See note 63 infra.
62. A bank can satisfactorily cover its forgery losses by insurance. See Comment, 62
YALE L.J. 417, 435-37 (1953). And it can spread the cost of the insurance to its customers
by charging higher rates for checking services. Its ability to do this, however, is limited
by the willingness of its competitors to charge similar fees and by the degree of sub-
stitutability between check6 and other methods of payment.
63. And this is the typical result since the "original taker" from the forger is usually
a small merchant who lacks ability to spread his losses. See Corker, supra note 49, at 31;
Comment, 62 YA.m Lj. 417, 433 n. 112 (1953).
64. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 131 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 318 U.S. 774 (1943) (application of impostor rule to government checks to
promote transferability) ; United States v. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 34 F. Supp. 230
(W.D. Pa. 1940) (restriction on guaranty of prior endorsements); Note, 54 MIcH. L.
REv. 996 (1956).
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